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Law is a science, but its administration is an art; diligent
pursuers of this art devise methods by which they achieve success,
and when these successes present developments in practice which may
be made of common use, they are as much the concern of others
engaged in the same field of endeavor as are advances in the science
itself. With these thoughts in mind, it seemed to the writer that, in
view of the constant complaints of the law's delay, a plan which has
materially aided one of our busiest appellate tribunals in bringing its
work up to date1 may well be considered a subject of general interest.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has accomplished this desirable
result very largely by confining oral arguments in each case to one-
half hour a side; but, to make the short-argument plan effective, addi-
tional rules were required, and one of the chief of these provides that
a concise statement of the controlling questions for decision, drawn
according to strict regulations outlined in the rule, must be included
in the brief of every appellant. These regulations have proved so
useful in operation that a discussion of their origin, terms and advan-
tages appears to be warranted.
The court had long required a statement of the "history of the case,"
and, originally, it was intended that this should show, in narrative form,
without unnecessary details, not only the nature of the controversy and
the steps taken in the court below, but also the points to be determined
on appeal. Counsel, however, fell into the habit of inserting so many
details as to obscure the controlling questions; as a result, hope of
obtaining this information through the medium of the history of the
case was abandoned, and, in i9oo, new rules were promulgated requir-
ing appellants to insert in their briefs a separate "statement of the ques-
tions involved."
At first the regulation on the subject read thus: "The statement of
the questions involved is designed to enable the court to obtain an imme-
diate view of the nature of the controversy. It must state the ques-
tion or questions in the briefest and most general terms, without names,
dates, amounts or particulars of any kind whatsoever. It should not
By "bringing its work up to date," I mean that, when the last session of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania opened, all cases which were ripe for argument
and decision had been heard and disposed of by opinions filed, and the lists are
now in such condition that, where desired, cases can be, and many are, set for
argument within seven weeks from the perfection of the appeal, or in less time
where both sides are prepared and agree to the advancement.
1x [287]
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exceed six or eight lines, and must not, under any circumstances, exceed
half a page. For any violation of this rule the paper-book will be
suppressed and the appeal non prossed . . . This rule is to be
regarded as in the highest degree mandatory and admitting of no
exception." Realizing the natural tendency to particularize, the court
provided further that "It shall be optional with counsel to add such
particulars as may be thought necessary in his history of the case."
The rule governing "the statement of questions involved" has been
changed twice. In 1911, it was amended to read that the statement
"should not ordinarily exceed ten lines," as compared with the "six'or
eight" at first prescribed, but the maximum allowance was still half
a page. In 1923, the rule was made to read "it should not ordinarily
exceed fifteen lines," and the maximum was extended to one page.
This increase was to cover occasional cases where more space might
be needed than was before permitted; not to allow the insertion of
details.
The intention is that the statement of questions involved shall be
framed in such a manner, that by reading it, the court, without being
compelled to examine the argument of counsel or any other part of
the brief or record, may quickly see the nature of the legal issue, and in
a general way, what points it will be called on to decide. As an aid
to this end, the latest rule requires appellant to print the statement on
the first page of his brief, and to put nothing else thereon.
If an appellee thinks appellant's statement inaccurate, or that it
does not present the points for decision in a proper light, he may sub-
mit a counter-statement as well as a counter-history of the case. .Coun-
sel for appellees avail themselves of this privilege in about fifty per
cent of the appeals, though quite often appellant's statement is so satis-
factory that the court, in writing its opinion, takes up the questions
involved just as they are stated and follows that order throughout.
This is the best proof of their value, for it shows that they have served
as an aid both on oral argument and in reaching the final decision of
the case.
The rule is now firmly established to the satisfaction of all con-
cerned, and there have been so many decisions explaining its meaning
that the profession in Pennsylvania has come thoroughly to understand
it; for the benefit of those outside the state, who may desire
further information than is given in this article, some of the leading
authorities on the subject are mentioned in the foot-notes. These cases
and others of their kind have now reached the point where they form
a body of constructions representing an established system, which may
be taken advantage of in other jurisdictions.
The cases show a steadfast determination that the new requirement
shall not be frittered away, as the old one concerning the history of
the case had been; accordingly, from the beginning, the rule was
rigidly enforced. The first year following its adoption, an appellant's
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brief was presented which contained no statement of the questions
involved, and the appeal was non prossed.2 Many other appeals, for
the same reason, suffered a similar fate.
It was likewise insisted that the statement be kept within the pre-
scribed limits. In afi early case, appellant's brief contained a state-
ment exceeding the permitted length; this was condemned as being
"worthless for the purpose for which it was intended, viz., to enable
the court to obtain an immediate view of 'the nature of the contro-
versy," and the profession generally was admonished to adhere strictly
to the rule.3 In keeping with this admonition, later appeals were non
prossed because of the undue length of the statement of questions
involved;4 and some appeals were quashed at bar.5 One opinion goes
so far as to say that this penalty may be inflicted for violations of the
rule "even in murder cases. '6
The decisions have made it plain that counsel assume great risks
to their clients either in disregarding the requirements of the rule or
in permitting printers to do so. Thus, in one case where the statement
took up a page and a half, but was printed in large type and double
spaced, suppression of the brief was avoided solely on the ground that
the matter would not have exceeded half a page had it been printed in
the ordinary way.7
A too lengthy statement is invariably due to the insertion of inneces-
sary details; it is attributable almost never to the fact that the questions
involved could not be set outtatisfactorily within the prescribed limits.
A recent case in the 'Superior Court of Pennsylvania, having the
same rule as the Supreme Court, furnishes an excellent example of a
statement of the questions involved which could have been materially
condensed and made more clear by omitting details of dates, etc. As
prepared by counsel, it read: "The question involved is, whether the
plaintiff, who signed an application for a policy of insurance upon his
dwelling house, in the Mutual Life Insurance Company of Annville,
Lebanon County, Pa., about five o'clock P.m., Saturday, June io, 1905,
and paying simply the application fee of $2.50, and there being no mail
from that community by which the said application could be sent to
the company for its acceptance or rejection until about eight, o'clock
A. M. of June 12, 19o5, and before the application could be sent the
premises for which the application had been made was destroyed by
fire, of which the agent who was authorized simply to receive applica-
tions for insurance, was duly notified, can recover for the loss? Was
'Fifth Ward B. & L. Assn. v. Boylan (igom) "98 Pa. 25o.
' Van Sciver Co. v. McPherson (1gol) igg Pa. 331, 335, 49 At. 73.
'Green v. Sumby (1915) 248 Pa. 120, 93 Atl. 868; Duffee v. Bankers' Surety
Co. (1915) 247 Pa. 17, 93 AtI. 17.
'H v. T- (19o4) 208 Pa. 233, 57 AtI. 562.
Com. v. Strail (igo8) 220 Pa. 483, 484, 69 AtI. 866.
"Buckrnan v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. (1911) 232 Pa. 351, 354, 8I AtI. 332.
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there any negligence on the part of the company, on its agent, because
the agent did not forward the application, after he hdd knowledge of
the destruction of the premises by fire, before it was possible to have
forwarded the'application by mail, simply to have the company reject
the application pro forma, as would bind the company and make it
liable?"
Some such statement as the following, omitting all particulars
which do not aid in outlining the legal question involved, would per-
mit a readier grasp of the problem: Request for insurance against fire
was signed by applicant and insurance company's agent, who accepted
application fee. Agent had authority only to receive and not to pass
upon applications. Before the request could be mailed to company for
approval or rejection, the premises were burned down. On receiving
notice of the fire, agent tendered return of the fee and did not f or-
ward the application to company. Approval of application was later
refused. Was there a contract, of insurance on which company is
liable?
From the rule that, in the absence of a statement of the questions
involved no part of the appeal will be considered, it was but a logical
step to say that, where a particular point urged on appeal is not included
in or suggested by the statement of questions involved, the point will
not be determined; this is now the established practice.8 It has been
held in several cases that such matters are not properly raised" and,
therefore, are not before the court,10 the authorities saying that only
those questions which are in the statement,11 or are relevant to and
suggested by it,12 will be reviewed. The court does not go beyond the
statement of questions involved, 13 for by it counsel limit the matters
'Murphy v. Ahlberg (I916) 252 Pa. 267, 27o, 97 AtI. 406; Spang v. Mattes
(I916) 253 Pa. 101, 103, 97 AtI. iO26; Hopkins v. Tate (I916) 255 Pa. 56, 62, 99
AtI. 210; Yeagerv. Anthracite Brewing Co. (1917) 259 Pa. 123, I3O, 102 AtL 418;
Huntington v. Supreme Commandery (1918) 261 Pa. i68, 172, 1o4 At. 498;
Silver v. Edelstein (192o) 266 Pa. 531, 532, iog AtI. 679; Garvey v. Thompson
(1920) 268 Pa. 353, 355, 112 Atl. 82; Haughney v. Gannon (1922) 274 Pa. 443,
447, 118 AtI. 427; Friedline v. Friedline (1923) 275 Pa. 463, 467, 11g AtI. 545;
Lane v. Dickson (1923) 276 Pa. 306, 309, 12o AtI. 264.
" Lenox Coal Co. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co. (1920) 265 Pa. 572, 576, iog
Atl. 282.
"Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Topliss (1915) 249 Pa. 417, 423, 94 AtI. 1099;
Pramuk's Appeal (1915) 250 Pa. 45, 5I, 95 Ati. 326; Kennedy v. Rothrock Co.
(1918) 261 Pa. 580, 588, 1o4 AtI. 746; Kiobeloch v. P. H. B. & N. C. Ry. Co.
(1920) 266 Pa. 140, 143, 1O9 AtI. 619.
'Kanawell v. Miller (1918) 262 Pa. 9, 14, 1O4 At. 861; Philadelphia v. Ray
(1920) 266 Pa. 345, 347-48, 1O9 At. 689; Blough v. Lochrie (1923) 275 Pa. 491,
496, 1ig AtI. 654.
"Felin v. Philadelphia (1913) 241 Pa. 164, 170; Collingdale Boro v. Phila.
Rapid Transit Co. (1922) 274 Pa. 124, 129, 117 Ad. 909.
"Furman v. Broscious (920)'268 Pa. 119, 121, i1O Ad. 736.
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to be considered, 4 and this limitation is binding on appellant.15 Ques-
tions which could be raised should be included if counsel want them
decided, 6 for the court has held that, by his statement, appellant
"specifies all mnatters [he] desires to have reviewed,"' 7 and that those so
contained are the only ones "on which [he] is entitled to be heard,""'
the theory being that counsel does not deem questions omitted worthy
of attention.19  The court has said also that, to call for consideration,
a question not expressly set forth must be plainly suggested20 or clearly
comprehended by reference or direct implication 2' in the statement of
the questions involved.
The above pronouncements are from cases construing the rule as at
first written; the present rtule, following previous decisions, expressly
provides that "ordinarily no point will be considered which is not set
forth in the statement of questions involved or suggested thereby."
The authorities have always held, however, that it is within the dis-
cretion of the court to pass on issues which rightly belong to the
case, though not brought forward by the statement of questions
involved, and this is done when deemed proper.2
Although each point appellant desires determined ought to be
included in the statement of questions involved, yet every one so
included is not nedessarily entitled to c6nsideration; again, the dec-
laration that a particular question is involved does not cure defects or
omissions in other parts of the appellate procedure. For example,
the legal issue urged by an appellant must ordinarily have been raised
in the trial court, or it will not be reviewed on appeal;"3 and a case
will not be considered on a theory different from that advanced in the
court below,"4 even though the point or new theory is put forth in the
statement of questions involved. Exceptions to the rulings complained
of on appeal must have been taken in the court below, for, unless the
"dKeck v. P. H. B. & N. C. Ry. Co. (T922) 271 Pa. 479, 482, I15 Atl. 824;
Etnier v. Pascoe (1923) 275 Pa. 308, 310, 119 AtI. 406.
i"Mcllvaine v. Powers (1921) 270 Pa. 341, 343, 113 At!. 365.
"Lincoln v. Wakefield (1912) 237 Pa. 97, 1O7.
"Hanlon v. Dazi.t (x923) 276 Pa. 113, 118, iig Atd. 822.
"StePhens-Adamon Mfg. Co. v. Armstrong (1914) 245 Pa. 552, 553.
"Yeager v. Gateley & Fitzgerald (1919) 262 Pa. 466, 471, io6 Atl. 76.
"Sullivan v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. (1922) 272 Pa. 429, 436, 116 Atl. 369.
Vulcanite Paving Co. v. Philadelphia (1916) 252 Pa. 6oo, 602, 97 At. 928.
Ferguson'v. Pittsburgh &' Shazwnut R. R. Co. (1916) 253 Pa. 581, 585 98 AtI.
732; Clark v. Butler Junct. Coal Co. (1918) 259 Pa. 262, 267, 102 At. 952; Comp-
ton v. Hoffman (1919) 265 Pa. 257, 264, io8 At!. 626; Palkovitz v. American
Sheet & Tin P. Co. (192o) 266 Pa. 176, 182, 1O9 At. 789; Com. v. Smith (1920)
266 Pa. 511, 517, 1o9 At!. 786; Opening of Parkway (1920) 267 Pa. 219, 227, 1I1
At. 144; Crumley v. Penna. R. R. Co. (1922) 272 Pa. 226, 231, 116 Atd. 15;
Pittston Twp. School Dist. v. Dupont Boro. School Dist. (1922) 275 Pa. I83, 191,
ix8 At. 308; Clapp v. Hunt (1923) 276 Pa. 127, i29, iig Atd. 818.
'Woodward & Williamson's Assessment (1922) 274 Pa. 567, 570, 118 At!. 5oi
Maisel v. Patrick Corr & Sons (1923) 277 Pa. 331, 333, 121 At. 61." Saxman v. McCormick (1923) 278 Pa. 268, 273, 122 At!. 296.
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trial judge's attention has been called to such matter, the appellate courts,
if the error is not basic and fundamental, will not consider it
25 even
when included in the statement of questions involved.
The rule requiring a statement of questions involved does not relieve
appellant from filing formal assignments of error ;2
6 though assign-
ments which are not in effect comprehended by the statement will ordi-
narily be dismissed.2 7 Alleged errors not specified in the assignments
or not otherwise properly before the court have no place in the state-
ment of the questions involved,28 and will not be determined even
though found there.29 The questions stated should not be in form
"merely a repetition of the specifications of error; ' '2 ° if that only were
desired, there would be no necessity for this extra part of the brief.
Several assignments of error may involve only one question of law,
because there may have been many alleged errors committed, in dif-
ferent ways and at different times, as a result of a supposed misappre-
hension of one legal principle; all such assignments must be embraced
by one question. Where the main questions have been stated and
other subordinate ones are assigned for error, these lesser questions,
if they directly relate to the main ones, may be stated in an abstract
way which ordinarily would be insufficient if they stood alone and
unconnected with other questions involved. Thus, following the state-
ment of the main questions, "Correctness of instructions as to the
effect of non-production of certain testimony, and concerning the con-
dition and conduct of plaintiff after accident; rulings on admission and
rejection of testimony," will indicate sufficiently the nature of the other
points raised. If, however; these minor questions are "necessarily
involved in or suggested by the principal questions stated," then their
recital as separate questions is "not required or desired."
31
When the statement contains practically self-evident propositions
to which a negative answer would be immediately given, unless those
propositions really control the case, appellant has done nothing to
advance his cause or to assist the court. 32 If self-evident propositions
are involved, they must have some application to the facts of the par-
ticular case, and, if the dispute concerns their application, then the
statement should show the question of applicability.
?I Rahn's Est. (1912) 233 Pa. 602, 6o8; Stone v. Stone (1923) 277 Pa. 277, 278,
12r AtI. 5oo; Saxinan v. McCormick (1923) 278 Pa. 268, 273, 122 Adt. 296.
" Thompson's Est. (1916) 253 Pa. 394; Schuylkill Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com.
(1919) 265 Pa. 451, 452, 1o9 AtI. 151.
-"Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1913) 232 Pa. 456, 462; Garvey v.
Thompson (I920) 268 Pa. 353, 355, 112 At. 8a
I Com. v. Snyder (1918) 261 Pa. 57, 61.
"Haddock v. Plymouth Coal Co. (1912) 237 Pa. 37, 40; Citizens Bank v. Lesko
(1923) 277 Pa. [74, 18o, 12o AtI. 8oA.
, Creachen v. Bromley Bros. Carpet Co. (i9o6) 214 Pa. 15, 17.
' Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1911) 232 Pa. 456, 462.
" Swisher v. Sipps (19o2) 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 43, 47.
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Framing a statement of the questions involved requires the cultiva-
tion of the art of eliminating immaterial details; but, after a lawyer
has gone over the case with his client and witnesses, prepared his plead-
ings, and tried it in the court below, he should be able to state in a very
few words the points which will control the decision on appeal, and
this is all that the rule requires. If in writing a brief, one focuses his
attention on the controlling points, it should be easy to state them Within
narrow bounds; should there be failure in this respect, however, and
the error be discovered only after the briefs are prepared, it may be
remedied by inserting a corrected page in the printed books. If the
briefs have been filed already, counsel may ask leave to amend accord-
ingly; attempts to rectify prolix or indefinite statements by filing type-
written corrected ones have been held to be bad practice.3
While the rule requires that the statement be in the "most general
terms," this means that the particular question should be stated in
terms of generality, not that the statement may be vague, indefinite or
uncertain. For example, to say that a question involved is the "charge
of the court," does not suggest what legal proposition is in dispute ;34
nor does "the correctness of answers to certain of defendant's points,"
or "portions of charge specially assigned as error." 5  The statement
of the questions involved must show the precise point of substantive
law at issue and its applicability to the facts in hand. Statements such
as, "sufficiency of the affidavit of defense,"3 6 "Did the affidavit of
defense raise questions of fact which should have been submitted to a
jury?" and "Did the court below err in the entry of judgment,"37 are
too indefinite to comply with the rule. Again, merely raising a question
of power does not ask the court to'determine whether there has been
an exercise of it. Thus, "Can a husband transfer his personal estate
in payment of his debts, regardless of coverture?" does not put the
question of whether or not he did so in the particular case.38
The following examples of badly stated questions involved, taken
from briefs in recent cases, are illustrative of inadequate attempts to
comply with the .rule:
"Should the court below have entered a nonsuit ?" This fails even to
suggest what questions are involved.
"Whether the gift to Danforth Phipps Wight lapsed by reason of his
death before death of testatrix, and whether Barrington Wight was
not entitled to three-eighths of the residue instead of one-fourth?"
This statement suggests that the construction of a will is involved, but
little else.
=Rowan v. Corn. (1918) 261 Pa. 88, 90, 304 AtI. 502.
Corn. v. Coccodralli (ig2o) 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 324, 328.
"Jones v. Matheis (igoi) 17 Pa. Super. Ct., 220, 221.
"Devers v. Sollenberger (1904) 25 Pa. Super. Ct, 64, 69.
"Internat'l Say. & Tr. Co. v. Kleber (igo5) 29 Pa. Super. Ct., 20o, 2o2.
Duncan v. Duncan (1920) 265 Pa. 471, 473, lO9 AtI. 222.
294 YALE LAW JOURNAL
"Is there sufficient competent and relevant testimony in this record
upon which to base an award for compensation?" 'Such a question
as this is involved in every workmen's compensation case; to put it
forward as the point in a particular controversy is useless for the pur-
pose intended to be acconiplished by the rule under consideration.
"Action prematurely brought; misjoinder of parties defendant; vaca-
tion of street on city plan by action of municipality; absence of allega-
tions of acts by defendant which would constitute an interference
with public use of a street; negotiations inducing plaintiffs to purchase
are merged in their deeds; absence of any averments of facts consti-
tuting a violation of any covenant entered into by defendant with
plaintiffs; absence of privity of contract between plaintiffs and defend-
ant; restrictions must run with the land to bind defendant; effect of
failure to record plan of which defendant had no record or actual
knowledge or notice; laches of plaintiffs in failing to have plan
recorded; plaintiffs' cause of complaint not cognizable in equity; plain-
tiffs have adequate remedy at law." This rambling statement pre-
sents no intelligible problems, only argumentative suggestions.
"(i) Does the evidence disclose such breach of contract on the part
of defendant as to justify binding instructions for plaintiff for the
amount of damages claimed? (2) In plaintiff's defense to defendant's
counter-claim, was the testimony offered by plaintiff as to market value of
steel ingots, competent and properly admitted ?" No judge could under-
stand the true meaning of these questions without reading the notes of
trial or history of the case; the statement is faulty in that it does not
take specific questions from a field of possible ones and state them
for decision.
The following properly stated questions involved, from briefs in
recent cases, are good examples of compliance with the rule:
"Where a court of equity has entered a decree ordering a husband
to pay a certain sum of money under the terms of a separation agree-
ment and he fails to make payment, has the court power to attach the
person of the husband ?"
"The liability of a subscriber to telephone service to pay at the rate
prescribed in the. company's schedule of tariffs filed with the Public
Service Commission for service actually received, when the contract
between the company and the subscriber provides that it is to be effec-
tive only in the event of a certain number of telephones being installed in
a community and the required number never were installed."
"Is the process of making roasted coffee from green coffee a manu-
facturing process which exempts the proceeds of the sale of roasted
coffee, delivered from the place where the process is carried on, from
a mercantile license tax, under the terms of section ii of the Act of
April 22, 1846 (P. L. 489) ?"
"Where a testator provides as follows: 'Item. I give unto my
beloved wife. . . the house in which I may reside at the time of my
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decease, should said house belong to me, but in case said house should
not belong to me then I give . . . to my said wife the house I now
reside in, she to have, hold and enjoy the same during all the term of
her natural life, and upon her decease, I order and direct that the same
shall go into and form a part of my residuary estate to be disposed of
as is hereinafter directed,' and at the time of his death the house inwhich he resides does belong to him, does his widow take a life estate
or a fee simple tijle in and to .said property ?"
"Does the conversion of private, dwellings into apartment houses by
additions thereto violate a restriction that there shall not be erected on
the ground a building or buildings designed for any purposes other
than a private dwelling house and that no such building erected thereon
shall be occupied or used for any purpose other than a private dwell-
ing ?"
"Is the cleaning and sprinkling of streets and collection of refuse
by a municipality a governmental function exempting it from liability
for the negligence of its employees in the performance of such work?"
"(i) Whether a widow living separate and apart from her hus-band at and before his death, not being supported by him, and not
dependent on him, is entitled to compensation as his widow under the
Workmen's Compensation Act; (2), Whether step-children, not part
of decedent's household at time of his death and not dependent on him,
are entitled to such compensation."
"(I) Has execution defendant who claims no ownership in goods:
sold, power to petition to set aside sheriff's sale? (2) Should the
court permit actual owner of goods to intervene to set aside sale? (3)
Should sheriff's sales be set aside because of gross inadequacy of price,
where prospective bidders on premises leave scene of advertised sale,
on suggestion of sheriff's auctioneer, because of failure of sheriff to
appear at the hour fixed for sale?"
"Should a juror be withdrawn and the cause continued on the appli-
cation of defendant, where members of the trial jury were present in
another court room, during a recess in the trial, listening to the delivery
of forcible arguments, and to the reading of newspaper articles, refer-
ring to the particular offense for which the defendant is on trial?"
"(i) Where a son, not a member of his father's family, who has'
a family of his own, renders services to his father, at the latter's request,
of such a character as would not ordinarily be rendered gratuitously
by a son so situated for a parent, what is the measure of proof required
to establish a contract to pay for such services? (2) Where a son
has been emancipated and has engaged in business for himself, living
at a remote distance from, his father's residence, is there a presumption
of gratuitous service where the son leaves his family at this father's
request, goes to his father's home and takes care of his father and
mother, where the father is able to pay?"
"If A, a manufacturing corporation, and B, an individual, nake
296 YALE LAW JOURNAL
a parol agreement that, in consideration of B doing certain things,
A will furnish B with a certain commodity as long as A does business
in its then present location; B carries out his part of the contract; A
also, for a period of seven years, carries out its part of the contract,
when, without any reason except that B has had 'service long enough,'
A refuses further to furnish B with the commodity; what is the meas-
ure of damages?"
"Where a partnership doing a general banking business hires a safe
deposit box to two of its patrons who leave a key thereto with the
cashier, a partner, and he enters their box; removes bonds there-
from; sells the same; deposits the proceeds, with other funds, to
the credit of the partnership bank in a bank where it kept a general
account, and made deposits almost daily, which were mingled generally
with other funds; and thereafter the partnership bank makes a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors, can the said patrons treat the
fund realized from the sale of their securities as a distinctive trust
fund and compel the assignee to pay the said amount to them in prefer-
ence to general creditors ?"
In the beginning of this article, it is stated that one of the things
chiefly responsible for the success of the system of restricted, or half-
hour, arguments, which has enabled the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania to bring and keep its business up to date, is the rule here dis-
cussed, requiring a concise statement of the controlling questions to
appear on the first page of the appellant's brief in every, case. The
above examples of properly stated questions involved, show at once
the value of this requirement, both to the court and to the barrister,
When the rule is efficiently followed, as it is in the great majority of
cases, the court can, at a glance, perceive, at least in a general way,
the points for determination, and, with this accomplished, the judicial
mind can better concentrate on the argument; while the advantages
to the barrister are equally as great, for the obligation to formulate a
statement of questions involved39 compels concentration on the main
or controlling points in the case both in the preparation and delivery
of the argument, so that in most instances lawyers brought up under the
rule are able to present even complicated cases within the limited
time alldwed for oral argument,4' depending, of course, on the printed
Rules of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 42 and 43, require appellants'
briefs to contain statements of the questions involved and expressly permit
counter-statements by appellees.
Ibid. Rule 72 provides that appellant and appellee shall each be allowed thirty
minutes in which to present his side of the case, and reads: "If two or more
appeals are from the same judgment or decree, but raise different and unrelated
questions, counsel for each appellant will be allowed thirty minutes and counsel for
all the appellees thirty minutes, to be divided between them as they may decide,
and subject to an extension if the presiding justice shall consider more time
necessary."
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history of the case4' and the argument in their briefs for the detailing
of noncontrolling facts, discussion of minor matters, elaboration of
legal points, and application of cited authorities. Thus the oral argu-
ment performs its true function of briefly introducing the case to the
court and affording the judges who are to decide it an opportunity to
make inquiry of counsel, and the latter to enlighten the court, on points
which may suggest themselves in -course of the presentation. Another
advantage is that this enforced segregation of and concentration on the
main points in the case enables counsel, in preparing their briefs,
readily to eliminate from the record and testimony matter not relevant
to the actual questions involved on the appeal as required by another
very useful rule of court.4
2
" Ibid. Rule 5i provides: "The history of the case must begin with a statement
of the form of action, followed by a brief reference to the pleadings, or papers in
the nature thereof, upon which the case was tried or heard in the court below, and
to any other pleadings or papers which were passed upon by it, if its order or
judgment thereon is assigned as error or they are pertinent to the questions raised
on the appeal; must include a brief statement of any prior decision of this court,
or of the Superior Court, in the same case or estate, and a reference to the place
where it is reported; must give the names of the judges whose rulings are to be
reviewed; must contain a closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative
form, of all the facts which are necessary to be known in order to determine the
points in controversy; and must briefly state the verdict and judgment, order or
decree appealed from; but must not contain any argument, or quotations from the
testimony"; and Ibid. Rule 47 permits appellee to print a counter-history of the
case, providing that, if he fails to do so, or, in his brief, otherwise to challenge the
statement of facts in appellant's history, "it will be assumed he is satisfied with
them."
, "Ibid. Rule 55 provides that: "Evidence which has no relation to or connec-
tion with the questions raised by the assignments of error, must not be printed;
nor must deeds or long documents, the construction or validity of which are not in
issue, but only such parts thereof as are necessary for a proper consideration of
the case. In order effectually to carry out the foregoing requirement, appellant
shall file in the court below, before he commences the printing of the Record, a
brief statement of the questions he intends to argue on the appeal 'and of the
evidence he does not intend to print, and shall serve copies thereof on appellee,
together with a written notice that consent will.be presumed if no objections are
made within ten days thereafter, unless the court below, on cause shown, shall
grant an extension of time. If objections are made, the court below shall forth-
with fix a time for hearing them, and shall then decide the dispute in accordance
with, and subject to the provisions of the Act of May 1i, I9i, P. L. 279 [legisla-
tion permitting, and setting up judicial machinery to carry out what this rule
requires]. In passing on the materiality of evidence, the inquiry shall not be
whether the court below deems the evidence substantial, but whether it refers to
the particular contentions made by the litigant."
